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Summary 
Green Water Credits is a mechanism for payments to land users for specified land 
and soil management activities that determine the supply of fresh water at source. 
These activities are presently unrecognised and unrewarded. Direct payment will 
enable better management and therefore less runoff, flooding, and siltation of 
reservoirs, and more groundwater recharge and stream base flow, particularly 
during the dry season. At the same time, Green Water Credits will diversify rural 
incomes and help communities to adapt to economic and environmental change. 
The proof-of-concept project aims to demonstrate the viability and feasibility of the 
concept. World-wide experience with payments for environmental services (PES) 
initiatives1 offers several useful lessons: 
 
 
Security of expectations 
 
a) The purpose must be clearly understood by all parties. Green Water Credits are 
payments for specified land and soil management practices which affect the 
provision of watershed services   They are not payments for water, payments 
for past activity or restraint, or a subsidy for conservation although this may be 
a collateral benefit; 
 
b) Buyers and sellers must be clearly identified. The buyers are downstream water 
users that benefit from security of supply and protection against damaging 
floods. The sellers are land users in the catchment who are in a position to 
determine water resources at source; they must have control over the use of 
land and water in the catchment; 
 
c) The specified management must be clearly linked to the benefits required; 
cause-and-effect must be established between the management activities and 
improved groundwater recharge, stream flow and water quality; and control of 
erosion, siltation and flooding. Buyers must know that upstream land managers 
can effect these improvements; 
 
d) Buyers need confidence that the specified management activities will be carried 
out to the required standard. Sellers need confidence that payments will be fair 
and will be made for long enough for them to benefit from their investment. 
 
 
                                          
1 PES initiatives have been developed for a number of environmental services: watershed services, 
carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and landscape beauty.  This report focuses primarily on 
the experience with payments for watershed services as this is most relevant to Green Water Credits. 
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Policy, legal, and institutional framework 
 
e) PES schemes benefit from a supportive policy, legal, and regulatory setting. But 
they can operate successfully in the absence of land titles or formal PES laws; 
 
f) NGOs and civil-society organisations have an important part to play in ensuring 
that the poorest can participate in PES programs. 
 
 
Design of payment mechanisms 
 
g) In developing countries, simple mechanisms such as contracts have mostly 
been used. Cash payments are the most common; in-kind payment is another 
option; 
 
h) The rate of payment should be negotiated on the basis of the cost of the 
specified management practices, specifically the opportunity cost of changing 
management practice, and the buyers’ willingness to pay;  
 
i) Simple monitoring approaches and sanctions such as temporary exclusion can 
be effective. However, this requires an intermediary with local knowledge.  
 
 
Costs and benefits for upstream land managers 
 
j) Specific consideration needs to be given to the trade offs between different 
goals - such as efficiency, effectiveness in improving water resources, and 
poverty alleviation;  
 
k) To enable the poorer farmers to take part, rules will be needed that allow for 
informal tenure and small land holdings, and which hold-down transaction 
costs; 
 
l) Efforts should be made to enhance non-financial benefits such as capacity-
building and improvement in social organization;  
 
m) Payment in advance, or credit, is needed to match the benefits to the upstream 
land managers with their costs. 
 
 
Costs and benefits for downstream water users 
 
n) In the absence of direct private-sector beneficiaries, governments can fund 
payments to upstream land managers; 
 
o) Many PES programs have focused on using upland forests to deliver watershed 
services. However, farm practices in the catchment can also provide these 
services while, simultaneously, retaining or enhancing farm production. 
 
 
iii 
Green Water Credits: Lessons Learned 
 
Applying Green Water Credits in Africa 
 
p) The inclusion of many farmers, each controlling only a small patch of land, 
imposes high transaction costs which will erode the amounts that can be paid 
out to the service providers; 
 
q) The payments mechanism will have to take account of multiple and overlapping 
sources of formal and informal authority; 
 
r) Many of the major river basins of Africa are shared between one or more 
countries; this is a challenge for basin-wide implementation of Green Water 
Credits; 
 
s) There are gaps in the capacity of existing water management institutions; NGOs 
and community-based organisations can help bridge these gaps. 
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1 Introduction 
Green Water Credits is a mechanism for payments to land users for specified water 
management activities that determine the supply of fresh water at source. These 
activities are presently unrecognised and unrewarded. Direct payment will enable 
better management. At the same time, Green Water Credits will provide reliable 
diversification of rural incomes, helping communities to adapt to economic and 
environmental change. 
 
Green Water Credits addresses two Millennium Development Goals: Goal 1, to 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, and Goal 7, to ensure environmental 
stability. It combats poverty and hunger by enhancing people’s resilience to 
external shocks by enabling them to build assets: water resources, stable soils, 
better and more reliable crops, and diversified rural incomes. It addresses 
environmental stability by improved land and water management that will benefit 
water supplies downstream, enhance aquatic and wetland habitats, reduce siltation 
of reservoirs and waterways, and protect land and infrastructure from floods. 
 
The source of fresh water is rain and snowmelt. Depending on soil use and 
management, it is either shed as damaging runoff or infiltrates into the soil. The 
infiltrated water may be used by plants (green water), returning to the atmosphere 
and coming back again as rainfall, or it recharges groundwater and stream base 
flow that can be tapped for use downstream (blue water), Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Green and blue water in the water cycle 
 
 
Depending on soil management, the amount of water that infiltrates into the soil 
may be increased two- or three-fold – with an equivalent decrease in soil erosion, 
drought, and floods. The key water managers are rural people – farmers, 
pastoralists, woodmen - but the delivery of water is accidental to their daily 
management of the land; it goes unrecognised and unrewarded. 
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At source, fresh water has been treated as common property, so there is no 
incentive for sustainable management. Green Water Credits remedies this market 
failure through payments from the downstream beneficiaries to upstream land 
managers for the water management services that they provide. The payments 
provide a financial incentive for the upstream water producers; they introduce 
market forces in support of water resource management and allocation. 
 
This report is a synthesis of the literature on schemes that have provided payments 
for environmental services (PES); it reviews a wide range of PES experiences, 
including schemes in both the developing and the developed world. These 
experiences are analysed by topic: the policy, legal and institutional framework, the 
design of payment mechanisms, costs and benefits for upstream land managers, 
and costs and benefits for downstream water users. In each section, lessons are 
drawn for the development of the new mechanism. Given that the proof-of-concept 
project is in Africa, the final section addresses implications for the application of 
Green Water Credits in that continent.  
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2 Policy, legal and institutional 
framework 
2.1 Property rights, title and established access 
Environmental services depend on access to land and water resources. Therefore, 
the laws and institutions must confer some minimum security of property rights, 
land tenure or recognised rights of access to the resource for the custodians or 
managers of land and water in the catchment. This does not mean PES schemes 
can work only in the presence of clear land title; for instance, in extractive reserves 
in Acre, Brazil, communities have secure access, withdrawal and exclusion rights 
that are sufficient for them to be compensated for their role in maintaining 
environmental services (Rosa and others 2004). Several other cases from Latin 
America demonstrate that the clear definition of land title is not a prerequisite for 
PES to succeed (FAO 2004); however, participants must be able to demonstrate 
land stewardship in order to guarantee provision of the service. 
 
 
 
Legal setting 
 
Specific legislation has sometimes been enacted: Costa Rica and Mexico, for 
example, have established national legal frameworks for PES. But most PES 
schemes operate without such a legal framework and this does not present an 
obstacle to success (FAO 2004). Other types of legal framework, not specifically 
designed for PES, also support PES projects; in the Philippines, a national law 
providing the legal basis for local government units to collect a share of the 
proceeds from natural resources was successfully used in court by one local 
government to compel a water district to pay 1 per cent of gross revenue for its use 
of natural resources within a watershed, part of which was to be used for protection 
of the watershed (Arocena-Francisco 2003). 
 
 
 
Policy and regulatory framework 
 
Supportive national policy and regulatory environments may also have a major 
impact on PES schemes; for instance, they can address and eliminate perverse 
incentives like subsidies for irrigation and industrial water use - a necessary 
preliminary step for successful PES implementation (Mayrand and Paquin 2004, 
Gouyon 2003).  
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: PES schemes benefit from a supportive policy, 
legal, and regulatory setting. But they can also operate successfully in the absence 
of land title or formal PES laws. 
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2.2 Civil society and the market 
 
Government institutions have a significant role but civil society and the market 
often drive PES. Evidence from developed countries suggests that market-based 
mechanisms, combined with civil society institutions, are best able to deliver the 
highest combined levels of efficiency and equity (Gouyon 2003). NGOs and 
community-based organisations can play an important role in this process through 
mediation with markets (Rosa and others 2004). Civil society organisations have 
also performed channelling and implementing functions to overcome transaction 
cost barriers to participation; government entities may also fill this gap. 
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: NGOs and civil society organisations have an 
important part to play in ensuring the poorest can participate in PES programs. 
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3 Design of payment initiatives 
3.1 Terminology – What are the payments for? 
 
The terminology used in PES initiatives has proved to be contentious - in some 
cases because of associations with neo-liberal policies and moves to privatise 
water, in others because of differences in opinion about what the payments are for.  
Are they a reward for services rendered; or an incentive to refrain from 
environmentally damaging activities; or compensation for losses already incurred, 
activities already undertaken, or land use restrictions in the past?  The Payments 
for Hydrological Environmental Services scheme in Mexico provides an example of 
these different views: case studies conclude that there was poor understanding by 
the recipients of the payments of the objectives of the program - payments were 
seen as a subsidy to conservation rather than as a payment for specific services; 
also,  the program was having little effect on behaviour – the payments were going 
to ejidos (communities managing commons) that already practised conservation or 
where there was little risk of deforestation (Martinez 2005).   
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: The term Green Water Credits may be difficult for 
buyers and sellers of the management services to understand. Certainly it needs to 
be explained carefully if the objectives of the scheme are not to be misinterpreted. 
 
 
 
3.2 Selling the service 
Existing PES initiatives have focused on three kinds of activity: 
 
• Asset-building: restoring natural habitat or tree planting, e.g. in Piracicaba, 
Brazil, funds from municipal water revenues are being used to assist farmers 
to plant trees in riparian areas (Viana and others 2002). 
 
• Restrictions on land use: maintaining existing natural habitats and 
protecting them from incursion, e.g. in Pimampiro, Ecuador, farmers are 
paid to conserve primary forest, natural grassland, and (at a lower rate) 
already-disturbed forest and grassland (Echavarría and others 2003). 
 
• Improving existing land use: e.g. by reducing pesticide use, reducing 
harvest rates to sustainable levels, or soil conservation. The Costa Rica PES 
scheme, until recently, paid landowners for sustainable forest management 
(Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). 
 
Lesson for GWC: In PES, land managers are not selling a commodity but a service 
that is believed to affect the supply and quality of a commodity or resource. They 
have been able to demonstrate that they are carrying out certain activities that 
maintain resources or environmental services. The scientific basis for making these 
links has often been weak but schemes have gone ahead where local perceptions of 
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the links have been strong, e.g. Pimampiro, where improvement in water-supply 
infrastructure also helped, and Los Negros in Bolivia (Robertson and Wunder 2005).  
In other cases, such as Lombok Island in Indonesia (Munawir personal 
communication 2006) and Mairana in Ecuador (Robertson and Wunder 2005), 
schemes have stalled because of buyer scepticism about the land-water links.  
 
 
 
3.3 Payment mechanisms 
Payment mechanisms are many and various. They include:  
 
• Direct contracts between buyers and sellers: e.g. The La Esperanza 
Hydropower project in Costa Rica signed a 99-year contract with the 
Monteverde Conservation League to maintain the watershed protection 
services provided by 3000 ha of cloud forest (Rojas and Aylward 2003);  
 
• Intermediary-based transactions: where negotiation of the contract is 
between the intermediary and the buyers and the intermediary and the 
sellers.  The intermediary may be government or an NGO. This category also 
includes trust funds which pool contributions made by water users to fund 
improved watershed protection, for example the Water Conservation Fund in 
Quito, Ecuador (Echavarría 2002); 
 
• Area-based schemes: where the rules and rates of payment are set out in 
national or local regulations (usually after negotiation).  An intermediary 
organization may be involved in administering the contracts.  Examples of 
national schemes include PES in Costa Rica and Mexico;  
 
• Product-based mechanisms: whereby land managers who meet the 
requirements of certification schemes, e.g. salmon- safe certificates in the 
USA, receive a price premium or other benefits such as improved market 
access;  
 
• Sophisticated trading mechanisms: such as credits, licences and use rights. 
These have been used only in developed countries, e.g. salinity credits in 
Australia. 
 
Lesson for GWC: In developing countries, simple mechanisms such as contracts 
have mostly been used. Intermediaries have played an important role in bringing 
buyers and sellers together; it is vital that the intermediary organization is well-
established and adequately resourced. 
 
Product-based mechanisms have not been used specifically for watershed 
protection but certification schemes could be an additional incentive to farmers; 
e.g. the Rainforest Alliance scheme for coffee requires restoration of natural forest 
and wildlife corridors, integrated pesticide management, and treatment of 
processing waste (CI/IIED 2006). 
 
 
 
6 
Green Water Credits: Lessons Learned 
 
3.4 Types of payment 
Payments are mostly in cash but there are examples where sellers have opted for 
in-kind payments: e.g. in Los Negros, Bolivia, the payment is one beehive per 10 
ha of forest conserved per year. Reasons for preferring in-kind payments in this 
case include the opportunity for lasting benefits through a new activity (as cash 
may be quickly spent) and associations of cash payments with the buying up of the 
forest by outsiders (Robertson and Wunder 2005).  
 
Lesson for GWC: While cash payments are the most common, the option of in-kind 
transfers should not be discarded. 
 
 
3.5 Determination of the rate of payment 
Ideally, rates of payment should be determined by both the value of the 
environmental service to beneficiaries and the costs to land managers. They should 
lie between the beneficiaries’ maximum willingness-to-pay and the sellers’ 
minimum willingness-to-accept. In practice, rates have tended to be set close to 
the minimum willingness-to-accept: upstream land managers are in a weak 
bargaining position because they are many, dispersed and, individually, control only 
small areas; also, it is harder for them to estimate the value of the service to 
downstream users than it is for proponents to estimate the opportunity costs of 
changing land management practices. For instance, payments in Costa Rica’s PES 
scheme were determined by the available funds and the opportunity cost of land in 
areas suitable for ranching (Pagiola and others 2005). 
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: Rates of payment are most likely to be determined 
according to the opportunity cost of changing management practices. This is a 
practical option but not necessarily the most equitable one. Analysis of willingness-
to-pay is also necessary to ascertain whether there will be enough demand.  
 
 
3.6 Monitoring and sanctions for non-compliance 
It has to be verified that the management practices paid for are actually being 
carried out. This may be done by remote sensing or by field inspection.  Small 
intermediaries argue that their personal knowledge of participants facilitates 
monitoring.   
 
Where participants are found to be violating the terms of the contract or the rules 
of the scheme, one possible sanction is to exclude them from the scheme thereafter 
(e.g. Los Negros in Bolivia), or for a pre-determined period (Pimampiro, Ecuador 
where the number of participants declined for a while as six-month exclusions were 
enforced but subsequently increased as participants decided to re-enter).  
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits:  Simple monitoring approaches and sanctions can 
be effective but require intermediaries with local knowledge. 
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4 Costs and benefits for upstream land 
managers  
4.1 Impacts on the poorest 
In most cases, PES have been designed as a means of reducing the costs of 
meeting environmental goals, rather than for poverty reduction, so they rarely aim 
at the poorest of the poor. To benefit directly from the sale of ecosystem services, 
people have to hold land; at least, they must have some formal rights over the 
resource – so the distribution and ownership patterns of land are critical to any 
impact of PES on poverty (Pagiola and others 2005).  
 
Landless labourers, usually the poorest group in the rural economy, are unlikely to 
benefit as sellers of environmental services (Grieg-Gran and Bishop 2004). The 
case of Sukhomajri, in India, where the landless were assigned water rights, is an 
instance of how a scheme can be designed to benefit the very poor but this is 
considered a special case and has proved hard to replicate (Kerr 2002).  In South 
Africa’s Working for Water program, otherwise-unemployed labourers are paid for 
removing alien vegetation, so contributing to improved water flow. 
 
Even where the poor hold land, they may not be well-placed to participate in PES 
because they may be unable to make or sustain the required changes in land 
management – which may conflict with their immediate needs. 
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: Specific consideration needs to be given to the 
trade offs between different goals, such as efficiency, effectiveness in improving 
water resources, and poverty reduction.  If Green Water Credits is to have the 
maximum benefit for water resources, it should focus on those land managers 
holding land in critical parts of the catchment and those most capable of making 
the required changes in management. If Green Water Credits is also to be pro-poor, 
special components will be needed; these may have to be funded separately 
because they are likely to affect the efficiency of the scheme.   
 
 
 
4.2 Barriers to participation of smallholders 
There is little evidence that a minimum size for participating landholdings is a 
barrier to the participation of smallholders in PES. But there are other barriers.  In 
Costa Rica, the minimum size of landholdings that qualify for PES is as small as one 
hectare for reforestation and two for forest protection (Rojas and Aylward 2003).  
Even so, smallholders in some areas are reluctant to join the scheme; a study of 
the Virilla catchment found that the main concerns of non-participants were about 
the rules, in particular the restrictions on using forest as a temporary shelter for 
cattle, and uncertainty over future changes in the law (Miranda and others 2003). 
 
The requirement of formal title to the land has also been an obstacle. Los Negros in 
Bolivia is an example of an initiative which has proceeded even though few farmers 
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have formal title. Local recognition of land boundaries, between neighbours, has 
provided a basis for the drawing up maps of land holdings and land conservation 
contracts - which are felt to be a benefit by the landholders because they 
strengthen their claims to title (Asquith personal communication 2005, Robertson 
and Wunder 2005). 
 
Lessons for Green Water Credits: To enable smallholders to participate, entry rules 
must allow for small land holdings and informal tenure. At all events, procedures 
and requirements should be straightforward. Transaction costs for small 
landholders may be held down by establishing a group application and monitoring 
procedure (although contracts should be individual). 
 
 
 
4.3 Financial and non-financial benefits 
The immediate and visible impact of market initiatives is on cash incomes. In 
Pimampiro, Ecuador, the local government is paying a small group of farmers in the 
headwaters of the town’s water supply to protect their forests.  In absolute terms, 
these payments are small ($US12 per hectare per year) but they constitute, on 
average, a third of household income, enabling the farmers to pay school fees, for 
health care, and other necessities (Echavarria and others 2004).   
 
Payments may also reduce people’s vulnerability to economic, social and 
environmental change by diversifying livelihood options into additional, resource-
based enterprises such as forestry. 
  
One of the most important spin-offs of the introduction of a system of payment for 
area-based services is formalisation of land tenure. PES and tenure reform may 
form part of an integrated project; alternatively, PES schemes may be restricted to 
places where land rights are already clear. Strengthening of social organisation may 
be another component of a payment scheme - for the practical reason that buyers 
need to deal with a small group of suppliers’ representatives, rather than 
innumerable individuals. Other benefits may follow: title is collateral against which 
to raise credit, and cooperatives are in a stronger position than individuals to trade 
in many things apart from environmental services. 
 
Capacity building is both an output of PES initiatives and, also, a prerequisite of 
their success. For instance in Pimampiro, farmers have received help with soil 
conservation, organic farming and forest management, which has enabled them to 
increase productivity and quality (Echavarría and others 2004). Capacity building 
within supporting institutions is no less significant. 
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: Financial benefits are important and immediate 
benefits of PES schemes but non-financial benefits such building capacity and social 
organization should not be ignored – rather they should be built into the design of 
the scheme.   
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4.4 Costs 
There are two main types of costs for upstream landholders: the costs of entering 
and remaining in the scheme (transaction costs) and the costs of making the 
required changes in management practices.  
 
Transaction costs can be very large, e.g. the running costs of the Chinese Sloping 
Land Conversion Program is about 60 per cent of its total budget (Wang Dehui and 
Jin Leshan, personal communication, 2006). And these costs are likely to be 
proportionately more for smallholders.  In Costa Rica, participants have the option 
of using an intermediary organisation but, in return have to pay 12-18% of their 
receipts; in the Virilla catchment 80 per cent of participants took advantage of 
intermediaries (Miranda and others 2003).  More significant in the case of the Costa 
Rica scheme is that the land must remain idle while the application is processed; 
this can take 12 months - too risky for many smallholders. 
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: Transaction costs erode the net benefits of PES, 
especially for smallholders, so application procedures need to be as simple as 
possible.  Group application may also help to hold-down costs. 
 
The costs of changing land management practices can also be significant and many 
activities involve big outlays.  For example in Nicaragua, a farmer with 20ha 
wanting payments under the RISEMP silvi-pastoral program would have to invest 
$US500 in the first year (equivalent to three quarters of income) to accomplish the 
specified practices (Pagiola and others 2005). 
 
Lesson for GWC: The timing of payments should match the timing of the costs to 
the service providers. Alternatively, credit may be provided. 
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5 Costs and benefits for downstream 
water users 
5.1 Benefits 
Land and soil management practices in the catchment are commonly associated 
with the following services: 
 
• Increased water transmission (absolute yield of blue water per unit rainfall) 
• Improved water quality 
• Buffering of above-average rainfall events 
• Reduction in extent and severity of soil erosion 
• Reduced sedimentation of reservoirs and waterways 
• Stability of slopes. 
 
Many PES schemes have focused on upstream forests to provide these services 
even though forests may not deliver the services expected of them. For instance, 
trees actually use a lot of water, more than most other kinds of vegetation, so they 
may reduce the transmission of water. And some kinds of forest – those without a 
thick surface litter layer, offer little protection against soil erosion. Equally, it is 
possible to deliver many of the desired environmental services in agricultural and 
pastoral landscapes. See, amongst others, van Noordwijk (2005), Falkenmark and 
Rockström (2004). 
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: PES program have focused on forests to deliver 
watershed services. Farm practices in the catchment can also provide these 
services while, simultaneously, retaining productive capacity. 
 
 
 
5.2 Willingness and ability to pay 
 
Willingness to pay for environmental services depends on the beneficiaries which 
include, in particular, water users. In the large commercial sector, these include 
hydro-power companies which require high-volume transmission, security of 
supply, and control of siltation in reservoirs (e.g. Pagiola and Platais 2002) and I 
such as the textile industry, steelworks and brewing. In Colombia, the electricity 
sector has contributed a percentage of its sales to finance watershed management 
(FAO 2004). The private sector may also be willing to pay for maintenance or 
improvement of water quality: for instance in the Philippines, a company bottling 
spring water is working with farmers in its catchment (Arocena-Francisco 2003).  
 
Other big water users are in the public sector and governments may assume 
responsibility for environmental services in their own right (Gouyon 2003). 
Municipal utilities pay for maintenance of water supply and quality in, e.g. New York 
(Swallow, Meinzen-Dick and van Noordwijk 2005) the Maasin watershed in the 
Philippines (Arocena-Francisco 2003) and Honduras (Mayrand and Paquin 2004). 
The Costa Rica PES scheme is funded by a basket of government fuel tax and 
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monies from water and energy utilities (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). Water 
utilities also finance PES systems in Honduras. Potentially, governments could fund 
services that reduce public risk from floods and landslides.  
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: In the absence of big downstream private-sector 
beneficiaries, governments can fund payments to upstream land managers. 
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6 Applying PES in Africa 
6.1 Existing initiatives 
There are no operational PES schemes in Africa but there are several initiatives to 
improve ecosystem management which may introduce payment systems as part of 
an integrated strategy.   
 
In Western Kenya, the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility are 
supporting an ICRAF- Kenya Agriculture Research Institute project to reduce soil 
erosion and pollution of Lake Victoria by supporting farm conservation strategies 
and local capacity building for integrated ecosystem management.  The aim is to 
encourage a move away from short-term planting of crops such as maize to more 
sustainable forms of agriculture.  The project focuses on nine 100km2 blocks of land 
in the Nzoia, Yala and Nyando river basins.  Within each block, 20 sites of 64 ha 
each have been randomly selected and the project will work with 8000-12000 
households.  The role of payments for watershed services in encouraging the 
transition to best management practices is not clear; farmers are expected to 
benefit through the diversification of farm production and the sale of carbon credits.  
 
Uganda Breweries Ltd and the Uganda Directorate of Water Development are also 
working together to reduce pollution in Lake Victoria and surrounding wetlands.  
The company is paying the National Wetlands Program to support the management 
of wetlands and to fund environmental education activities; Makerere University is 
monitoring water quality. This is a one-off case of corporate responsibility rather 
than an on-going contribution for environmental services (Alice Ruhweza, NEMA, 
personal communication, 2006).  
 
In South Africa, IIED and CSIR are examining the feasibility of payment schemes in 
the Sabie-Sand catchment, Mpumalanga, and the Ge-Selati River, Limpopo 
Province. The latter initiative faces complex water rights - governed by current 
legislation and historical abstraction rights; those paying for watershed 
management services would have no guarantee under current legislation that they 
would be able to access any additional water flow generated because of abstraction 
restrictions already in place (IIED 2005).  
 
 
 
6.2 Challenges in the African context 
 
A recent workshop on watershed management (Swallow and others 2005) 
highlighted various characteristics of catchments in Africa that are relevant to the 
introduction of Green Water Credits: 
 
• Levels of poverty are higher in Africa than in other regions of the world and 
many countries are experiencing increasing poverty;   
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• Most countries in Africa share river basins with other countries and most 
important water resources are shared among two or more countries; 
• National and regional institutions involved in watershed management have  
variable capacity, often weak – especially in respect of integration across 
disciplines; 
• There is a legacy of close dependence between land and water rights; water 
rights largely follow land rights.  Rights to land and water are held under 
multiple property systems and are sanctioned by multiple sources of 
authority. 
 
Across the continent, there is a great range of land and water management 
situations - in terms of hydrology, policy, culture, governance, investment, and 
poverty.  All this has to be taken into account in the design of Green Water Credits. 
There can be no guarantee that what works in one place will work in another. 
 
Poverty means that land users and governments have short-term 
perspectives and public investment is very dependent on the priorities of 
donors - who emphasise short-term poverty alleviation rather than long-
term investment in infrastructure, resource conservation and technical and 
management capacity (Swallow and others 2005). 
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: The short-term imperative of poverty 
reduction is an opportunity for Green Water Credits which offers immediate 
payments for better management practices. At the same time, there is 
greater pressure to demonstrate that the poor will benefit than in the case 
of schemes already operating in Latin America; and erosion of payments to 
the many smallholders by the high transaction costs (Section 4.4) is an 
important issue. 
 
Shared river basins: Most PES schemes have been introduced at the local 
or national level. Payments across international boundaries pose a 
challenge; the difficulties involved in negotiations between upstream and 
downstream interests, or achieving cooperation between municipalities, are 
formidable enough.  
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: A shared river basin does not rule out the 
introduction of Green Water Credits but some of the most significant river 
basins will be the more challenging. 
 
There is also the issue of demonstrating the impact on of changes in land 
use and management on water flow as the size of the basin increases. At the 
local scale, the impact of management is visible; at the basin scale, only a 
basin-scale change of management will have a visible impact - so decisions 
about future management have to be based on models. Faurès (2005) 
argues that, as the size of the basin increases, the impact of land use impact 
on the hydrological regime becomes insignificant compared with that of 
natural factors and extreme climatic events, but this does not apply so much 
to water quality. 
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Institutional capacity: Several African countries, notably South Africa and 
Ghana, have introduced new policies and legislation for water and 
environmental management; some cases involve the creation of catchment 
and basin authorities. But the capacity of water management institutions to 
implement these policies is lagging behind (Swallow and others 2005).   
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: Green Water Credits might be introduced 
most easily at the small, local level where there are NGOs or community-
based institutions to facilitate and provide support. Prerequisites of 
introduction at a larger scale include: 
 
- Information for decision makers about the links between, on the one 
hand,  land use and management and, on the other hand, green and 
blue water resources; also about the economic and social impact of 
water resource management; 
 
- Coordination across disciplines and between various institutions already 
in place - perhaps initiated by multi-stakeholder steering group; 
 
- Investment in capacity building for water management institutions at 
local and national or basin level; 
 
- Development of a platform for negotiation between upstream and 
downstream interests. This may be a new institution or some existing, 
mutually-respected and effective institution may assume this role. 
 
Overlapping rights and systems of authority: Crop production in Africa 
is carried out mostly by smallholders who operate under unsecured 
customary land ownership; grazing land is mostly communal (Kujawila 
2005). Superimposed on these informal systems are recent, formal systems 
of land registration which vary in their coverage and effectiveness but are 
widely considered to have proven inappropriate in the African context 
(Quan, Tan and Toulmin 2005). 
 
The complexity is illustrated by the Nyando Basin in Kenya where land and 
water are held under at least six kinds of private tenure, and at least five 
types of public land administered under different statutes and involving 
different government departments. Also, ethnic groups such as the Luo have 
strong customary authorities with many and various prohibitions and 
restrictions on individual land use. Clans and sub-clans are important 
sources of social authority but, in some parts of the watershed, land 
allocation policies have placed clusters of different ethnic groups next to 
each other - with the result that traditional systems of authority have been 
weakened (Swallow, Onyango and Meinzen-Dick 2005). At the village and 
farm level, several projects and programs such as the National Soil and 
Water Conservation Program have established focal area development 
committees to coordinate local contributions to extension and development 
plans!   
 
Lesson for Green Water Credits: Multiple and overlapping sources of formal 
and traditional authority for land and water management have to be 
recognised in the design of the scheme. Where there are strong customary 
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institutions or well-functioning community development committees, these 
may provide a means for grouping farmers together for negotiation, 
monitoring, and channelling payments. 
 
 
 
6.3 How can Green Water Credits increase the 
resilience of communities in the face of  
drought, floods and climate change? 
Water scarcity in drylands is not a function only of annual rainfall. In the first place, 
it depends on the seasonal and year-to-year variability of rainfall, especially the 
frequency and intensity of droughts and dry spells. Figure 2 expresses this 
variability as the coefficient of variation (CV) of the climate moisture index - the 
ratio of rainfall to potential evapotranspiration. Class 3 is a CV of >0.75, class 2 a 
CV of 0.25-0.75, class 1 a CV of <0.25); the greatest variability is across the sub-
humid-semiarid transition zone which supports 20% of the African population. 
 
 
Figure 2: Africa, Inter annual CMI CV and populations subject 
(Vörösmarty 2005) 
 
Secondly, agricultural drought – drought in the root zone – is much more common 
than meteorological drought which is a period of much below average rainfall that is 
insufficient to maintain crops and pastures. Political drought - where various failings 
are attributed to drought - is commonplace. For instance in East Africa, 
meteorological drought occurs about once a decade, dry spells of 2-5 weeks in the 
growing season occur once in every 2 or 3 years (Barron and others 2002). The 
natural buffers against dry spells and drought are green water, stored in the soil, 
and perennial streams and groundwater (blue water) that are recharged by water 
infiltrated through the soil. Agricultural drought and water scarcity are frequent 
because most rain runs off the soil surface; farmers’ field water balances show that 
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only 15-20 percent of rainfall actually contributes to crop growth or recharges 
groundwater, the proportion is as little as 5 per cent on degraded land (Rockström 
2003).  
 
The purpose of Green Water Credits is to enable land users to make the most of 
green and blue water resources and, even, adopt practices that increase blue water 
delivery at the expense of farm production where this is demanded by the Green 
Water Credits market. Thus Green Water Credits is a mechanism for asset-building 
– stable soils, green and blue water resources, diversified rural livelihoods, and 
investment of cash – that builds the resilience of ecosystems and rural communities 
in the face of economic, social and environmental change. At the same time, it 
secures water supplies and ecosystem services downstream. 
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7 Conclusions 
It is obvious from the range of experiences examined in this paper that PES can be 
applied across a wide range of settings in the developing world, including in areas 
lacking formal land tenure and enabling legislation. Many of the initiatives reviewed 
demonstrate how intermediary organizations, such as community-based 
organizations, NGOs, and other civil society groups, could serve a key role in 
overcoming gaps in the formal legal and policy framework and, even, gaps in the 
capacity of governments. The importance of these organizations to the success of 
PES schemes is a common theme in this review, in particular in reducing 
transaction costs and facilitating participation of farmers with small land holdings 
and insecure tenure. Thus, while Green Water Credits is not limited to specific 
locations with a pre-defined set of characteristics, it will always need to identify 
appropriate partner organizations.  
 
Given that there is almost no previous experience with PES in Africa, early 
consideration of specific elements necessary in the African context will be crucial in 
the design of pilot operations. However, the clear message that emerges from the 
diversity of the schemes reviewed is that the PES concept is flexible and adaptable.  
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